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This Comment critically analyzes the split in the circuits over the
second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. Further, this Comment
predicts how the Seventh Circuit will rule on this split.
The
Ellerth/Faragher defense is an affirmative defense available to employers
who would otherwise be held liable for their supervisors’ harassing acts in
hostile work environment situations. There are two prongs to the defense:
(1) “the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and (2) “the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.” Some courts drop the second prong of the defense in singleincident cases of harassment, arguing that the affirmative defense is fact
specific, impermissibly imposes strict liability in single-incident cases, and
is unfair to employers. This Comment suggests that the Seventh Circuit
will affirmatively apply both prongs of the defense in all situations based
on its adherence to precedent, trends in the lower courts, and its rationale
in another recent circuit split. Further, this Comment argues that the
application of both prongs of the defense is the correct standard
regardless of the length of time of the harassment.
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1. The Videotaped Dep. of Annastacia Alalade at 24:8, 29:7–9, 30:3–9, 30:15, Alalade v.
AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (No. 3:09-CV-338).
2. The Videotaped Dep. of Annastacia Alalade, supra note 1 at 9:12–13, 12:10–13.
3. Id. at 14:1–3, 24:5–9, 24:19–22.
4. Id. at 30:2–15, 31:10–16.
5. Id. at 30:3–9, 30:15, 31:10–16, 31:25, 32:1–13.
6. Id. at 32:7–15.
7. Id. at 32:17–18.
8. Id. at 41:21–23, 46:16–18.
9. Def’s Ex. No. A, Charge of Discrimination, Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F.
Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (No. 3:09-CV-338).
10. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 937–38.
11. Sex (or sexual) harassment is a subset of illegal sexual discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. FRANCIS ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL
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At 9 a.m., at the beginning of a normal workday in January 2008, Ms.
1
Annastacia Alalade was assaulted by her supervisor at work. Ms.
Alalade worked for AWS Assistance Corporation (AWS) as a trainer,
2
feeding and giving medication to the residents at a group home. She
had worked under the supervision of Mr. Sam Ntawanda, without
3
incident, until January 21. Suddenly, that day, Mr. Ntawanda followed
4
Ms. Alalade into a pantry and physically and sexually assaulted her.
Mr. Ntawanda, a supervisor that Ms. Alalade’s employer trusted enough
to place in a position of authority, grabbed her, pushed her against the
pantry wall, unzipped her pants and removed her belt, kissed her, and
5
touched her inappropriately. During this incident, Ms. Alalade pleaded
6
for him to stop and tried to fight him away.
Ultimately, Ms. Alalade escaped from the pantry and locked herself
7
in a bathroom, but her trauma did not end there. Although Ms.
Alalade made a formal report to her employer, there was very little
8
follow-up and she got the impression that no one believed her. Ms.
Alalade decided to pursue formal charges against her employer and
filed a charge of discrimination in the Northern District of Indiana on
9
June 19, 2008. AWS subsequently argued (1) that the single incident of
harassment she experienced was not severe enough to constitute hostile
work environment harassment and (2) employers in single-incident
cases should be entitled to a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in which
only the first prong is applied, such that employers with a valid antiharassment policy who promptly respond to reports of harassment are
10
shielded from liability.
11
Sex harassment is still a very current and problematic issue—as
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evidenced above. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) reported that the highest number of workplace discrimination
claims of all time were brought in 2011, with sex discrimination claims
12
Of the sex
making up almost twenty-nine percent of all claims.
discrimination claims filed and resolved under Title VII in 2011, 11,364
13
(approximately forty percent) were sexual harassment claims. Within
14
this category, supervisory harassment issues comprise a significant
15
number of the cases that circuit courts see each year. Over a five-year
period, the eleven circuit courts and the D.C. Circuit reviewed a total of
16
126 supervisory sexual harassment cases. Yet the question of when
employers are liable for supervisory harassment remains a contested
area of sex harassment law. The Supreme Court seemingly settled this
issue when it established a two-pronged affirmative defense to employer
17
liability in the twin cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and
18
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, (hereinafter the “Ellerth/Faragher
defense”) but there is still disagreement among the circuits concerning

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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HARASSMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, LANDMARK DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR
EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT 4 (1999). Actionable sex harassment can take two forms:
quid pro quo or hostile work environment. Id. at 17; Arthur J. Marinelli, Jr., Title VII: Legal
Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 20 AKRON L. REV. 375, 380 (1987). Quid pro quo
harassment is the “conditioning of employment benefits on sexual favors.” Marinelli, supra,
at 380. Employers are strictly liable for supervisory quid pro quo harassment. ACHAMPONG,
supra, at 21. The focus of this Comment is on the liability of employers in instances of hostile
work environment harassment.
12. Charge Statistics FY 1997 through FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/stat
istics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). In 2011, there were 99,947
individual charges filed and 28,534 sex discrimination charges filed. Id.
13. Sexual Harassment Charges: EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997 – FY 2011,
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment.cfm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2013).
14. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the definition of “supervisor” for Title VII
purposes is a person who “is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment
actions against the victim.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). Thus, a
person is a supervisor for purposes of Title VII liability when the person has the power of
“hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign[ing] with significantly different responsibilities, or
[making] a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. at 2443 (quoting Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). Otherwise, a harasser is a coworker.
Whether the harasser is a supervisor or a coworker changes the standard of liability for the
employer. See infra Part IV.C for more information on this topic.
15. See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 210–11 (2004).
16. Id. at 210–11, 273 (the period was from June 26, 1998 to June 30, 2003). Of this total,
thirteen of the cases were in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 272.
17. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
18. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780, 807 (1998).
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19. See infra Part III.
20. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
21. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
22. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
23. See L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 717 (2007); G. Roger King, Sexual Harassment Claims in the
New Millennium: A Litigator’s Point of View, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 539, 548 (2001).
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part III.B.
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the application of the second prong of the defense.
There are certain instances in which an employer can be liable for its
20
supervisor’s illegal harassing conduct. This test is laid out in the twin
21
cases of Ellerth and Faragher.
Specifically, to avoid liability, the
employer must prove (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent
and promptly correct issues of harassment and (2) that the employee
unreasonably failed to report the harassment or otherwise take
22
advantage of an employer’s preventative measures. A straightforward
reading of this defense suggests that in any situation, an employer can
successfully invoke the affirmative defense only if the employee-victim
23
failed to report the harassment without justification. However, this is
where the circuit split arises.
Some courts have held that the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher
defense is inapplicable in single incidents of sex harassment, as AWS
argued in its response, discussed above. These courts hold that
employers must prove only the first prong of the defense in order to
24
prevail when there has been a single, severe incident of harassment.
Generally, these courts use three arguments to justify applying a
modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in single-incident cases: (1) the
factual differences between their cases and the Ellerth and Faragher
cases, (2) the need to avoid strict liability in applying the defense, and
25
(3) the desire for fairness to employers. On the other hand, some
courts refuse to drop the second prong of the defense in any
26
circumstances. These courts argue that the language of the defense is
clear; there is no indication from the Supreme Court that a separate test
should be applied in single incidents of harassment; and that the defense
can serve to reduce damages to the employer, thereby making it more
27
fair.
This Comment will explore the circuit split over the second prong of
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28. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
29. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
30. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011).

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 90 Side B

the affirmative defense to employer liability, hypothesize how the
Seventh Circuit will decide this issue, and argue whether this is the
correct approach. Part II of this Comment overviews Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the federal prohibition on employment
discrimination), the Supreme Court’s recognition of hostile work
28
environment harassment in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, and
the Ellerth and Faragher cases that led to the affirmative defense to
employer liability for supervisor harassment.
Part III of this Comment delves into the circuit split over the twopronged Ellerth/Faragher defense. It looks first at the rationale of
courts that have dropped the second prong and then at the rationale of
courts that have refused to do so. It concludes with a case study of
29
Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., an opinion from a district court
within the Seventh Circuit—a circuit that has not yet decided on the
circuit split one way or the other.
Part IV of this Comment hypothesizes how the Seventh Circuit will
decide this issue. It argues that the Seventh Circuit will likely continue
to apply both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense as established by
the Supreme Court in all instances. This prediction is based on the
Seventh Circuit’s history of adherence to binding Supreme Court
precedent, the trend in Seventh Circuit district court decisions regarding
the split, and an analogy to the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in another
30
relevant circuit split over the definition of “supervisor” for Title VII
purposes.
Finally, Part V of this Comment argues that it is the correct decision
to apply both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in all cases. The
Supreme Court crafted a straightforward and workable defense that
considers both the employer and employee’s interests. Although some
courts argue that it is not fair for employers to be held liable in singleincident cases of harassment solely because the employee reported the
harassment, the reality is that the Supreme Court anticipated this exact
result. Whether harassment occurs one time or on an ongoing basis, the
rule forces employers to take responsibility for harassment in their
workplaces. Additionally, this result is justified because employers are
not innocent in hiring and promoting harassers to the position of
supervisor, especially in comparison to the truly innocent employee-
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victims. Moreover, the second prong of the defense serves an important
purpose of providing a check on the practicality of the employer’s antiharassment policy mandated by the first prong of the defense.
II. TITLE VII, MERITOR, AND THE CREATION OF THE
ELLERTH/FARAGHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
31
discrimination, including discrimination based on sex. After Title VII’s
enactment, it was unclear to many courts whether workplace sexual
32
harassment qualified as actionable discrimination under Title VII. The
33
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson answered in
the affirmative: sexual harassment is actionable when it is quid pro quo
34
Meritor suggested that
or creates a hostile work environment.
employers may be liable for the harassing acts of their supervisors but
failed to establish exactly what the standard for liability was. This
question was ultimately decided by the Court in Burlington Industries,
35
36
Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.
In short,
employers are liable for supervisory harassment in hostile work
37
environment cases, subject to the availability of an affirmative defense.
A. Title VII and the Meritor Backdrop

C M
Y K

01/13/2014 11:22:05

31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
32. See Marinelli, supra note 11, at 377–78 (“The initial district court decisions almost
uniformly rejected sexual harassment as a cause of action under Title VII because of fear of
widespread and friv[o]lous litigation. . . . The early cases viewed sexual harassment as a
‘personal’ dispute and gave little weight to the employment context within which the sexual
harassment took place.” (footnote omitted)).
33. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
34. Id. at 66. See also supra note 11 for a definition of quid pro quo harassment and see
infra note 52 and accompanying text for the elements of a prima facie hostile work
environment case.
35. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
36. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
37. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. 807.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
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Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is an “unlawful
employment practice” for any employer to discriminate against an
38
employee or a potential employee because of that person’s sex.
Specifically, an employer may not “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
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39

employment” based on that person’s sex. The congressional intent of
Title VII is two-fold: to deter discriminatory activity and to compensate
40
the victims of discrimination.
41
The landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
interpreted Title VII to determine that hostile work environment sexual
harassment, in addition to quid pro quo harassment, is an actionable
42
claim under Title VII.
In Meritor, Vinson was a bank teller who
43
Vinson
suffered ongoing harassment from her direct supervisor.
maintained that she eventually agreed to an ongoing sexual relationship
44
with her supervisor because she was afraid of being fired. Ultimately,
Vinson brought a Title VII claim of sexual harassment against her
employer, Meritor Savings Bank, yielding mixed results from the district
45
court and the court of appeals.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed Vinson’s claim on the grounds that the sexual relationship
with her supervisor was voluntary; thus, there was no Title VII
46
violation. The court opined that even if there had been a violation of
Title VII, Vinson’s employer would not have been liable to Vinson
47
because it had no knowledge of the alleged harassment. The Court of

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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39. Id.
40. John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The
Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory
Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1407
(2002).
41. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
42. Id. at 65–66 (“[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”). The first
case from a lower court to recognize a hostile work environment claim was Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234, 237–38 (5th Cir. 1971). In contrast, quid pro quo harassment occurs when an
employer “require[s] sexual consideration from an employee . . . for job benefits.” Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 900, 908, 912-13 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding quid pro quo
harassment when a supervisor prevented an employee from attending the police academy
unless she would engage in a sexual relationship with him).
43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59–60.
Vinson’s supervisor reportedly touched her
inappropriately, followed her into the bathroom, and “forcibly raped her on several
occasions.” Id at 60.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 60–62.
46. Id. at 61–62 (explaining that Vinson “was not the victim of sexual
harassment . . . while employed at the bank.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47. Id. at 62 (“After noting the bank’s express policy against discrimination, and finding
that neither respondent nor any other employee had ever lodged a complaint about sexual
harassment by [the supervisor], the court ultimately concluded that the bank was without
notice and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions of [the supervisor].” (internal
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit completely disagreed.
The court of appeals held that Vinson had a clear case of hostile work
environment sexual harassment and that employers should be strictly
liable for any supervisory sexual harassment that occurs in their
49
workplaces.
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that hostile
work environment sexual harassment claims are valid grounds on which
50
to bring a suit. Thus, the Court in Meritor held that a hostile work
environment arises when there is unwelcome sexual behavior that is
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
51
and create[s] an abusive working environment.” To establish a prima
facie case of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) [t]he plaintiff
was a member of a protected group; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature; (3) the unwelcome sexual
conduct was based on sex; [and] (4) the conduct affected a term,
52
Ultimately, the Court
condition, or privilege of employment.”
remanded Meritor for a complete factual finding consistent with these
53
elements.
The Court in Meritor recognized that there may be instances in
which an employer is vicariously liable for the sexual harassment of its
54
employees, but failed to establish exactly when that liability attaches.
The Court rejected theories of mere negligence or strict liability on their
own, stating that employers should not always be “automatically liable

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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quotation marks omitted)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 62–63 (“[T]he Court of Appeals held that an employer is absolutely liable for
sexual harassment practiced by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew or
should have known about the misconduct.”).
50. Id. at 65–66. The Court based its opinion in large part on the EEOC Guidelines
from 1980 that said the same. Id. EEOC Guidelines have particularly persuasive force in
discrimination litigation. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (recognizing
that the EEOC’s interpretation is entitled to “great deference”); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (recognizing “the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations”).
The Supreme Court has held that
“interpretations and opinions” of an administrative agency are relevant because they
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
51. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66–68; ACHAMPONG, supra note 11, at 41.
52. ACHAMPONG, supra note 11, at 41 (footnote omitted).
53. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. The D.C. Circuit remanded Meritor without further
comment. Vinson v. Taylor, 801 F.2d 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (unpublished table opinion).
54. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
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for sexual harassment by their supervisors,” yet “absence of notice to an
55
employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability.”
But because Meritor was the first Supreme Court case to recognize a
claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment and the specific
factual elements had not been litigated thus far in the case, the Court
56
remanded the case without issuing a standard for employer liability.
57
This incomplete standard left lower courts in disarray. Following
Meritor, the majority of courts tended to hold employers liable based on
a negligence standard unless the harassment was quid pro quo by a
58
supervisor, in which case the employer would be vicariously liable.
Yet, there was disagreement over exactly why this was the correct
practice. The Supreme Court acknowledged this confusion and
59
established what it hoped to be a “uniform and predictable standard”
60
in the landmark Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v.
61
City of Boca Raton cases. Although these cases were not initially
brought together, the Court treated them as twin cases and issued their
62
opinions, identical in many important respects, on the same day.
B. The Ellerth/Faragher Defense
The issue of employer liability in supervisory harassment cases came
63
to a head in the twin cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and
64
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in both cases in order to settle the circuit split over when employers are
65
liable for supervisory harassment.
The Supreme Court could not
impose a strict liability standard for employers because such a standard

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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55. Id.
56. Id. at 72–73.
57. Michael C. Harper & Joan Flynn, The Story of Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: Federal Common Lawmaking for the Modern Age, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 225, 226 (Joel WM. Friedman ed., 2006). This
disarray was exemplified in the Seventh Circuit’s handling of Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, which resulted in eight different opinions and “200-plus pages” in the Federal
Reporter from the justices. Id.
58. See id. at 237.
59. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
60. Id. at 742.
61. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
62. Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 225.
63. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742.
64. Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
65. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753; Faragher at 780, 785–86.
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was barred by its holding in Meritor, but the Court felt that the standard
66
should be something more than negligence. To that end, the Supreme
Court created a two-pronged affirmative defense in an attempt to
balance the competing interests of employers and employees in
67
supervisory harassment suits.
Both Ellerth and Faragher were Title VII sexual harassment suits
68
involving ongoing supervisory harassment.
In Ellerth, the plaintiff
claimed that her supervisor had constantly subjected her to offensive
and sexual remarks and on one occasion had touched her knee in an
69
invasive manner. Burlington’s employee handbook contained a policy
regarding anti-harassment procedures, but Ellerth did not think that the
70
policy was ever enforced nor did she know to whom to complain.
Ellerth did not inform her employer about the harassment and resigned
71
from her position after a year.
Similarly, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, Faragher suffered
ongoing harassment for five years during her job as a lifeguard for the
72
Boca Raton Parks and Recreation Department. Two of Faragher’s
immediate supervisors made offensive comments about her physical
attractiveness, touched her without invitation, and simulated lewd
73
Although the City maintained a sexual
gestures in front of her.
harassment policy, it failed to properly disseminate it throughout the
74
Parks and Recreation Department in which Faragher worked.
Faragher ultimately quit her job without formally reporting the
75
harassment.
In both cases, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining when
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66. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759, 763–64; Faragher 524 U.S. at 791–92.
67. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
68. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748–49; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
69. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748. The harasser was not Ellerth’s immediate supervisor;
however, Ellerth’s direct supervisor reported to the harasser, and the harasser had the
authority to make employment decisions regarding the hiring and firing of employees. Id. at
747.
70. Id. at 749; Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 234.
71. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747–48.
72. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
73. Id. at 782. Women were the minority on the lifeguarding staff at this time,
numbering only four to six, and these two supervisors had harassed each of them at one point.
Id.; Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 228.
74. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 781–82.
75. Id. at 780, 782. Unfortunately for Faragher’s supervisors, she continued on to Case
Western Reserve University Law School. Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 228.

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 93 Side B

01/13/2014 11:22:05

NEALS 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

178

12/3/2013 1:59 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[97:1

an employer should be liable for the harassing actions of its
76
77
supervisors. The Court first looked to Meritor for guidance. Meritor
suggested that Congress intended the Court to use agency law as a
guiding principle in formulating employer liability because Congress had
78
used the word “agent” in the definition of employer under Title VII.
Keeping in mind that Meritor stood for the proposition that employers
are not strictly liable for supervisory harassment, the Supreme Court
79
then turned to the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
The Supreme Court looked specifically to section 219 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, entitled “When Master is Liable for
80
Torts of His Servants.” Generally under the Restatement, an employer
is not liable for the torts of its employees unless the torts are committed
81
within the scope of employment.
The Court stated that sexual
harassment is not usually done within the scope of employment, so it
82
looked further to the exceptions found in section 219. Under section
219, an employer can incur vicarious liability for tortious employee
actions committed outside the scope of employment when “(a) the
master intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the master was
negligent or reckless, or . . . (d) the servant . . . was aided in
83
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” Thus,
an employer is strictly liable for its supervisor’s actions if the harassment
was a result of the employer’s own tortious intent or that of a high-
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76. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. Ironically enough, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Ellerth not to determine the issue of liability, but to resolve
whether a claim of sexual harassment could stand without a tangible employment action
taken against the employee. Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 240. However, the oral
argument opened and closed with discussion on the issue of liability, and the majority of the
oral argument hour was spent on liability as well. Id. It is clear from the two opinions that
the justices were really deciding the issue of liability, not whether hostile work environment
could stand as a claim without a tangible employment action. Id. at 242.
77. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72
(1986)); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70–72).
78. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791.
79. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–59; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–805.
80. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–59; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–805; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958). The scope of employment
rule requires that employees are acting with the purpose of furthering the employer’s business
goals. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70:505 (5th ed. 1984)).
82. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757–58 (stating that supervisory harassment is usually done for
“personal motives”).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a)–(d).

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 94 Side A

01/13/2014 11:22:05

NEALS 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/3/2013 1:59 PM

FLIRTING WITH THE LAW

179

84

ranking employee acting as a proxy.
Additionally, an employer is
vicariously liable under the Restatement if the employer acted
negligently—if it knew or should have known about a hostile work
environment and failed to take action—or if the tortious act could not
85
have been committed but for the agency relationship.
Thus, the Court was at a crossroads. It appreciated the benefits
offered by the potentially expansive theories of direct and vicarious
liability but was restrained by its holding in Meritor that employers
should not be strictly liable for supervisory harassment. Additionally,
the Court recognized that negligence was merely a “minimum
standard,” and as the plaintiff in Ellerth urged, Title VII demanded a
86
more stringent liability standard. The Court compromised between the
theories of vicarious liability and negligence in holding that employers
are vicariously liable, subject to an affirmative defense, in instances of
hostile work environment supervisory harassment when there was no
tangible employment action (such as termination) taken against the
87
employee. The defense provides that if an employer can prove by a
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84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (a); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59;
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b)–(d); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59.
The Court seemed persuaded by the argument that the harassment could not have been
committed without the agency relationship, thus imputing vicarious liability on the employers,
but it recognized its limitation in that every plaintiff in every case could argue that the
harassment would not have occurred but for the supervisor being employed by the employer.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Marks, supra note 40, at 1418 (noting that the Court believed that this
theory gave good support for imposing vicarious liability on the employer based on the fact
that “an employer selects and trains its supervisory personnel, . . . confers upon supervisors a
status imbued with a special capacity and opportunity to harass subordinates, and an
employer can monitor supervisors more directly”).
86. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
87. Id. at 764–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite
Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 695 (2000);
Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for
Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 529, 553–54 (2006). Both the Ellerth and Faragher opinions “commanded
strong majorities” with only two justices dissenting. Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 241.
Inexplicably, Justice Ginsburg joined in the majority in Faragher but merely concurred in
judgment in Ellerth. Id.; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that she,
Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the Court’s holding and rule of liability). The two Justices who
dissented in both cases were Justices Thomas and Scalia. Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at
241. Justice Thomas took issue with the fact that the Court seemed to be engaging in
policymaking and formulating a rule out of “whole cloth.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 772 (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 250. He believed that the majority
completely misread section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency and had
consequently created an “unjustified symmetry” in the area of sex discrimination law that was
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preponderance of the evidence “two necessary elements,” it can avoid
88
“liability or damages.” The employer must prove “that [it] exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior” and “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by
89
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”
The defense incorporates “the agency principle of vicarious liability
for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority,” the twin aims of
Title VII (deterrence and compensation), and a measure of
90
reasonableness. The first prong reflects the negligence principle and
speaks directly to employer reasonableness by requiring employers to
91
This
promptly “prevent and correct” supervisory harassment.
requirement encourages employers to adopt formal policies against
harassment that incorporate a grievance procedure and resolution
92
system. These policies often demand prompt remedial employer action
93
upon a report of sexual harassment.
The second prong speaks to
employee reasonableness and the tort principle of avoidable
94
consequences. Prior to Ellerth and Faragher, many circuits stated that
employers should not be held liable for harassment that they did not
95
know about.
Thus, the second prong of the defense requires that
employees formally report harassment in order to provide notice to
96
their employers about problems in their workplaces. In general, the
defense works to “encourag[e] preventative action by both the employer
97
and employee.”
The Court applied the newly-formed Ellerth/Faragher defense in
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not paralleled elsewhere in Title VII. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 772–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 241. Somewhat forebodingly, Justice Thomas predicted
that this rule would open the floodgates of litigation and criticized the rule for failing to
clarify the law. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 774 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“There will be more and
more litigation to clarify applicable legal rules in an area in which both practitioners and the
courts have long been begging for guidance.”).
88. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
89. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
90. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
91. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
92. See Hébert, supra note 23, at 714–15; Murr, supra note 87, at 555–57.
93. See Hébert, supra note 23, at 714–15; Murr, supra note 87, at 556–57.
94. Marks, supra note 40, at 1421; see also Murr, supra note 87, at 609–11.
95. King, supra note 23, at 543.
96. Hébert, supra note 23, at 717.
97. Marks, supra note 40, at 1421.
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98

Faragher and found in favor of the plaintiff. The Court held that the
City of Boca Raton could not meet the first prong of the defense
because it did not sufficiently disseminate its sexual harassment policy,
thereby failing to exercise the requisite reasonable care that would
99
entitle it to the affirmative defense. On the other hand, Ellerth was
remanded to the district court for further factual findings and to allow
100
the employer an opportunity to raise the affirmative defense.
Although Faragher exemplifies a straightforward application of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense, certain circuit courts have since interpreted
and applied the second prong of the defense in such a way as to dash the
Supreme Court’s dreams of establishing a “uniform and predictable”
101
standard in this area of law.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE SECOND PRONG
Although some consider the two-pronged Ellerth/Faragher defense
102
103
“straightforward” and “simple,” the second prong of the defense
alone has managed to cause a split of opinion between various circuit
104
courts. The two prongs of the defense are (1) an employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct instances of sexual
harassment and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to utilize the
105
The
employer’s corrective mechanisms or to otherwise avoid harm.
defense has become controversial because some courts have
inconsistently applied the second prong, most commonly dropping it in
cases of single-incident or rapid-onset hostile work environment
106
Other courts hold firm to the notion that the
harassment.

01/13/2014 11:22:05

C M
Y K

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 95 Side A

98. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
99. Id.
100. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998). Harper and Flynn noted
that because Ellerth did not use her employer’s corrective mechanism as required under the
defense, her likelihood of success was low on remand; however, there is not a further record
of the case. Harper & Flynn, supra note 57, at 245–46.
101. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754; see also infra Part III.A.
102. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Indest v.
Freeman Decorating, Inc. (Indest II), 168 F.3d 795, 796 (Wiener, J., specially concurring)).
103. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D. Ind. 2011);
Marks, supra note 40, at 1404.
104. See Rachel Shachter, Note, Creating Equitable Outcomes Through Remedies: When
Reasonable Employers Must Be Held Liable for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 8 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 567, 567 (2001) (“Despite the clear structure of the two-pronged test, some
federal courts have determined that the second prong is optional.”).
105. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
106. See infra Part III.A.
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Ellerth/Faragher defense applies in all cases of supervisor hostile work
environment harassment where there was no tangible employment
107
action.
The Seventh Circuit remains silent on this issue, as noted in
108
Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.
A. Courts That Have Dropped the Second Prong
A number of courts have applied a modified Ellerth/Faragher
defense in certain instances. Generally, a modified Ellerth/Faragher
defense is one in which a court applies only the first prong and drops the
109
second prong.
In other words, the courts look at whether the
employer has acted reasonably with regard to preventative and
corrective procedures in the sexual harassment context, but ignore
whether the employee has acted similarly reasonable or otherwise
attempted to avoid harm. Consequently, an employer is not liable
under a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense if it “promptly exercise[s]
reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing
110
behavior.”
Most commonly, the second prong is dropped in single-incident or
111
rapid-onset cases.
Single-incident cases are situations where there is
one single occurrence of harassment, often very severe, as contrasted
112
with ongoing harassment that lasts for a longer period of time. Rapidonset harassment is generally understood as a sudden, serious instance
of harassment that could not have been prevented because there was no
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107. See infra Part III.B. Hereinafter, when this Comment refers to “all cases of
supervisor hostile work environment harassment,” readers should interpret this as referring
to instances in which there was no tangible employment action taken against the employee,
because if there was, strict liability attaches, and the question of employer liability is moot.
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70 (1986).
108. See infra Part III.C.
109. Marks, supra note 40, at 1404 (describing the modified defense as one in which the
courts read “the word ‘and’ between the two prongs of the defense [as] mean[ing] ‘or’ in
[certain] cases”).
110. John C. Ayres, Note, Is It Sexual Harassment or Not? The Single Incident
Exception, 71 MO. L. REV. 205, 208 (2006).
111. Marks, supra note 40, at 1423.
112. See id. at 1423 n.124. However, at least in the Eighth Circuit, it appears that a
single incident does not necessarily mean one occurrence, but could include harassment that
happens in one fell swoop, such as all in one day or evening. See McCurdy v. Ark. State
Police, 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004). One commentator has noted that in McCurdy, the court
categorized the case as a single-incident case by considering “the five or six acts of alleged
sexual harassment by [the supervisor] on July 5, 2002, as a single incident.” Ayres, supra note
110, at 217. For more instances of courts that have blurred the single-incident/rapid-onset
line, see infra note 304.
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113

lead-up to the incident.
Currently, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits use a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in single-incident or
114
rapid-onset cases. In addition, a Ninth Circuit district court and Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits’ non-precedential opinions have also endorsed
115
this viewpoint. In these cases, courts generally give three reasons for
deviating from the traditional Ellerth/Faragher defense: (1) the factual
differences between the Ellerth and Faragher cases and the case before
it; (2) the necessity of avoiding strict liability as was prohibited in
Meritor; (3) and the desire for fairness towards employers who have
116
done everything in their power to avoid workplace harassment.
1. Factual Differences
Many courts that deviate from a strict application of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense do so because of perceived factual distinctions
between the cases that inspired the defense and the cases presently in
front of the court. Specifically, these courts note that in Burlington

01/13/2014 11:22:05

C M
Y K

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 96 Side A

113. Marks, supra note 40, at 1404. There is no clear distinction between the definitions
of single-incident and rapid-onset, and they seem similar in many respects. Additionally, one
court has described the full Ellerth/Faragher defense as inapplicable to “incipient” cases.
Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc. (Indest I), 164 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J.).
Although the definition of “incipient” is unclear, it seems to mean a sudden and unavoidable
exposure to a hostile work environment to which a plaintiff promptly complains, or an “earlystage hostile work-environment claim.” Charles W. Garrison, Comment, Once Is Enough:
The Need to Apply the Full Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense in Single Incident and
Incipient Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1131,
1146 (2012); see also Marks, supra note 40, at 1423.
114. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d 762; Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 F. App’x 147 (2d
Cir. 2001); Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d 439, No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614
*1 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion).
115. See EEOC v. Asia Pac. Hotels, Inc., No. 10-00002, 2011 WL 3841601, at *5–6 (D. N.
Mar. I. Aug. 26, 2011); Indest I, 164 F.3d at 265–66; Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d
1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J., concurring specially).
116. The arguments boil down to these three rationales, although they are admittedly
intertwined (e.g., some courts may think that the defense is unfair to employers because it
imposes strict liability). A fourth potential argument was advanced by a district court in the
Eighth Circuit and relates to the construction of the defense as a whole. Some courts read the
“and” in the Ellerth/Faragher as an “or.” See, e.g., Keefer v. Universal Forest Products, Inc.,
73 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 1999). In Keefer, the court questioned the applicability of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense in a single-incident case where the supervisor allegedly forced the
plaintiff to remain in a shed with him for two hours, during which, he allegedly begged the
plaintiff to have sex with him. Id. at 1055–56. After citing relevant portions of Ellerth and
Faragher that establish the affirmative defense, the court suggested that “[a]lthough the
[defense] uses the conjunctive ‘and,’ it appears from the surrounding discussion that either of
these elements can be proved in order to establish the defense.” Id. at 1055 n.2.
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118

Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the
119
employees had been victims of ongoing harassment. Because of these
factual distinctions, these courts reason that the Supreme Court
intended the Ellerth/Faragher defense to apply only to similar factual
120
scenarios.
For example, the Eighth Circuit confronted the issue of singleincident sexual harassment and invoked the factual distinction argument
in order to apply a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in McCurdy v.
121
Arkansas State Police. McCurdy worked as a radio dispatcher for the
122
Arkansas State Police.
During one shift, a sergeant entered the
dispatch room and made comments about McCurdy’s body and her
123
McCurdy
attractiveness, hugged her, and touched her breasts.
reported the events to another sergeant—the highest-ranking official on
124
duty that night—when the sergeant arrived for work a few hours later.
Although the fact that McCurdy reported the harassment to a superior
would in principle preclude her employer from successfully using the
Ellerth/Faragher defense, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of
125
summary judgment in favor of the employer.
The court justified its deviation from the full defense by noting that
the Supreme Court had considered issues of repeated harassment in
Ellerth and Faragher while McCurdy’s harassment was a single
126
incident. The court stated that “[j]udicially adopted defenses should
not be viewed in a vacuum and blindly applied to all future cases,” and
held that the use of the Ellerth/Faragher defense would be inappropriate
127
To the court, applying the
based on the “unique facts” of the case.
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117. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
118. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
119. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest
I, 164 F.3d at 265.
121. McCurdy, 375 F.3d 762. For an in-depth look at this case, see Ayres, supra note
110.
122. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 764.
123. Id. at 764–65.
124. Id. at 765.
125. Id. at 771–74.
126. Id. at 771 (“In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court confronted cases involving
repeated incidents of supervisor sexual harassment. In contrast, we are confronted with
McCurdy’s case involving a single incident of alleged supervisor sexual harassment.”).
127. Id. Another case from the Eighth Circuit specifically noted that the defense was
“adopted in cases that involved ongoing sexual harassment.” Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,
175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1999). Thus, the court suggested that a plaintiff will never recover
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defense would be “like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole”
128
because of the distinct factual differences.
An additional factual difference some courts look to is whether the
plaintiff reported the harassment. The employees in Ellerth and
129
Faragher never reported being harassed. In many cases where courts
apply a modified defense, the employees utilized the employer’s
harassment policy and the employer quickly and remedially responded
130
For example, in Indest v. Freeman Decorating,
to their complaints.
131
Inc. (Indest I), the vice-president of the plaintiff’s employer made
“crude sexual comments and sexual gestures” to her on four separate
132
occasions over the course of a weeklong convention.
The plaintiff
reported these incidents to her director and the branch office manager,
who escalated the issue to a human resources director before the week’s
133
end. Although the court did not decide whether the harassment rose
to the level of an actionable hostile work environment claim, it held that
Indest’s claim failed nonetheless because there was no basis for
134
employer liability. The court held that the defense did not control in
this case based on the factual variances from Ellerth and Faragher, and
instead, the employer should be rewarded for taking swift action to
remedy the situation and for potentially impeding the creation of a
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“for any initial act of harassment as long as the employer subsequently responds.” Grossman,
supra note 87, at 714.
128. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 771.
129. See supra notes 71, 75 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Md. 2000). In
Jaudon, the plaintiff alleged that her transportation coordinator had followed her into the
restroom and looked over the stall at her, in addition to making inappropriate comments and
physical contact on a number of occasions. Id. at 156–57. Jaudon reported the harassment to
the director of human resources, consistent with her employer’s sexual harassment policy. Id.
The court granted summary judgment to the employer partially on the basis that the
employer proved the first prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, which the court asserted as
sufficient to avoid liability. Id. at 164. The court upheld the idea that an employer’s prompt
remedial action is sufficient to avoid liability based on a factual distinction between the
Ellerth and Faragher cases and the one at issue. Id. The court contrasted the fact that the
plaintiffs in Ellerth and Faragher had never complained to their employer, while Jaudon
complained in a timely fashion. Id. at 164 & n.6. The court said that the second prong makes
sense in a situation where an employee delays reporting the harassment, but otherwise it lacks
“practical application.” Id. at 164 & n.6.
131. Indest I, 164 F.3d 258.
132. Id. at 260.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 264.
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135

severe hostile work environment.
2. Avoiding Strict Liability

A second justification for applying a modified Ellerth/Faragher
defense in certain instances is to avoid imposing strict liability on
employers. Some courts contend that applying the Ellerth/Faragher
defense in single-incident or rapid-onset cases is akin to imposing strict
136
These courts argue that the
liability on the employers.
Ellerth/Faragher defense always imposes strict liability in supervisory
harassment cases when an employee reports the harassment because it
137
makes the first prong “irrelevant.” This implication “truly bother[s]”
138
some courts and leads these courts to conclude that the Supreme
Court “could not have meant what it said when it imposed the burden of
139
persuasion . . . [of] both prongs . . . on the employer.”
140
The court in McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police used the avoidance
of strict liability justification as an additional reason to grant summary
judgment to the Arkansas State Police even though McCurdy promptly
141
reported the sexual harassment from her supervisor. McCurdy argued
that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense was not available to her
employer because she had reported the harassment hours after it
142
The court rejected this argument and said, “McCurdy’s
happened.
argument, when boiled down, leads inevitably to strict liability for the
[employer],” and noted that this was an unacceptable result based on
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135. Id. at 265; see also Marks, supra note 40, at 1425 (arguing that the modified defense
“is intended to reward diligent employers who have promptly ‘nipped a hostile work
environment in the bud’—at an ‘incipient’ stage.” (footnotes omitted)). Although Judge
Jones’s opinion in Indest I is not binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit or elsewhere, it
nonetheless led to an “ensuing line of diligent-employer cases.” Marks, supra note 40, at
1443–44; see also Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 796 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially
concurring) (“Because [the third panel judge] concurs only in the judgment of this case
without concurring in Judge Jones’s opinion or mine, neither enjoys a quorum and thus
neither writing constitutes precedent in this Circuit.”).
136. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest I,
164 F.3d at 266.
137. See Daniel N. Raytis, Note, Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.: Dealing with
Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 623, 647 (2001).
138. Marks, supra note 40, at 1426.
139. Hébert, supra note 23, at 716.
140. McCurdy, 375 F.3d 762.
141. Id. at 764.
142. Id. at 765, 771.
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Meritor’s prohibition of strict liability for employers.
further stated that

143

The court

[d]enying such an employer an opportunity to avail itself of the
affirmative defense, when the employer has done all that an
employer could reasonably be expected to do to avoid and
remedy the offending behavior, effectively creates strict liability
for employers in a [single-incident] case—contrary to the
144
Supreme Court’s holding in Meritor.
In applying this rationale, the courts are attempting to adhere to
precedent but also trying to stay true to the policy rationale behind
Meritor. These courts believe that holding employers strictly liable for
supervisory harassment even though the employers have seemingly
done all they could do to avoid the harassment is “wholly contrary to a
145
laudable purpose behind limitations on employer liability.”
Furthermore, these courts believe that imposing strict liability (or what
appears to be strict liability) would discourage employers from
reconciling with their employees and dissuade them from quickly
146
correcting harassment in the workplace.
3. Desire for Fairness Towards Employers
Another argument made by courts in favor of applying a modified
defense in some circumstances is that it is not fair for employers to be
held liable for supervisory harassment because they are innocent—that
is, they have done everything in their power to prevent the harassment
147
in the first place and remedy it once it comes to their attention. These
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143. Id. at 771 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71–72 (1986)).
144. Id. at 772. The court in Indest I echoed a similar sentiment. It held that imposing
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense when an employer has made a “swift and
appropriate remedial response to the victim’s complaint would thus undermine . . . Meritor.”
Indest I, 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J.).
145. Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d 439, No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at
*5 n.16 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion). A district court
within the Fourth Circuit has gone so far as to describe the Ellerth/Faragher defense as “an
anathema to this court.” Corcoran v. Shoney’s Colonial, Inc. 24 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606 (W.D.
Va. 1998).
146. See Watkins, 201 F. 3d 439, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.16.
147. See Brian S. Kruse, Note, Strike One–You’re Out! Cautious Employers Lose Under
New Sexual Harassment Law: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), 78 NEB.
L. REV. 444, 456–57 (1999) (“[A] vicarious liability standard will work an extremely unfair
and punitive hardship on employers who proactively and cautiously try to prevent
harassment. . . . A faultless employer who in good faith attempts to prevent sexual
harassment in its workplace is still subject to liability.”); Shachter, supra note 104, at 576
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courts assert that a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense is appropriate
148
when the harassment is sudden and unpreventable. As articulated by
one court: “[I]t seems neither fair to that diligent employer nor
consistent with the underlying policy of Title VII to have that
employer’s Title VII liability turn on the alacrity of the complaining
149
Instead, in the interest of fairness, these courts want to
employee.”
apply a modified defense and hold the employers liable only if they fail
to do their due diligence in taking remedial action in response to
150
reported harassment.
As a result, some courts have altered the Ellerth/Faragher defense to
151
make employer response a turning point for liability. For example, in
152
a general manager of sales
Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Group,
complained to her employer’s management in October of 1994 that a
station manager had been sexually harassing her since February of
153
1994. Although the court ultimately concluded that the incidents did
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(recognizing the argument that if employers take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment,
then they are not wrongdoers for the purposes of Title VII liability and should not be held
accountable). Other commentators think that these courts are biased towards employers and
are using these superficial explanations to hide their true intentions. Hébert, supra note 23, at
715 (“[L]ower courts have applied [Ellerth and Faragher] in ways quite hostile to the interests
of women who have been sexually harassed and quite favorable to the interests of
employers.”); Lawton, supra note 15, at 245 (“[D]ecisions [that eliminate the second prong]
are troubling . . . [because] they reveal a bias in favor of employers. Courts like Watkins are
less concerned with the plaintiff’s ability to secure a remedy under Title VII than with what
they consider a ‘fair’ result for the employer.”); Marks, supra note 40, at 1444, 1454
(suggesting that “this [Indest I] precedent reflects an outright employer-oriented bias” and
that this line of cases results in “an overall ‘result-oriented’ bias among judges [because] they
simply do not want to hold reasonably diligent employers liable.”).
148. See Marks, supra note 40, at 1425; see, e.g., Watkins, 201 F.3d 439, 1999 WL 1032614
*1 (holding that the employer had shielded itself from liability for the unavoidable rape
because it satisfied the first prong of the defense by properly responding to the employee’s
complaints).
149. EEOC v. Asia Pac. Hotels, Inc., No. 10-00002, 2011 WL 3841601, at *5 (D. N. Mar.
I. Aug. 26, 2011).
150. See, e.g., Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999)
(Barkett, J., concurring specially).
151. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004); Van
Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 F. App’x 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2001); Richardson v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 1999); Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143,
153 (2d Cir. 1997); Cajamarca v. Regal Entm’t Grp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 237, 252–53 (E.D.N.Y.
2012).
152. Van Alstyne, 8 F. App’x 147.
153. Id. at 152–53. The station manager had held her hand, kissed her on the cheek,
brushed her hair away from her forehead, and repeatedly made unwanted romantic remarks
to her. Id. at 152.
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not rise to the level of an actionable hostile work environment, it
continued to state that even if these incidents were actionable, the
employer would be entitled to summary judgment because it took
“immediate and effective corrective action” after receiving the
154
complaint from Van Alstyne.
Van Alstyne characterizes the affirmative defense differently than
155
originally stated in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher
156
v. City of Boca Raton. The Van Alstyne court says that an employer is
entitled to the defense if:
(1) [T]he supervisor’s harassment did not culminate in a
“tangible employment action,” and (2) the employer can show
that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and (a) “the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise,” or (b) the employee complained
and the employer took “prompt and appropriate corrective
157
action in response to [the] complaint.”
Although the court did not fully explain the reasoning behind its
adoption of this standard, it concluded that the employer was afforded
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154. Id. at 153. Some courts believe that employers should be credited for taking swift
and appropriate responses to reported harassment, not punished with vicarious liability.
Cajamarca, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 252–53. The argument is that employers will have no incentive
to take remedial responses to reported harassment if doing so is seemingly irrelevant to the
question of liability. See id.
155. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
156. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Van Alstyne, 8 F. App’x at
152.
157. Van Alstyne, 8 F. App’x at 152 (citation omitted). In support of this articulation of
the defense, specifically for subsection (2)(b), the court cites Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115
F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 1997), and Richardson v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d
426, 441–43 (2d Cir. 1999). Id. Perry was decided in 1997 and references a negligence
standard that many courts used before the creation of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. Perry,
115 F.3d at 153; see also Stacey Dansky, Note, Eliminating Strict Employer Liability in Quid
Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Cases, 76 TEX. L. REV. 435, 440 (1997) (“[I]n early Title VII
sexual harassment cases, . . . the courts determined employer liability by applying
commonsensical, traditional notions of fault and negligence—an employer would only be
liable if it caused the harassment at issue or if it negligently failed to remedy the situation
after it knew of the discrimination.” (footnote omitted)). Richardson largely discusses the
negligence standard imposed for co-worker harassment, and in reference to supervisory
harassment, says “an employer is presumed absolutely liable in cases where the harassment is
perpetrated by the victim’s supervisor, although employers may interpose an affirmative
defense to rebut that presumption,” and cites Ellerth and Faragher. Richardson, 180 F.3d at
441. As a result, neither of these cited cases seems to support the modification.
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immunity because it had taken swift action in response to Van Alstyne’s
158
complaint of sexual harassment.
The McCurdy court similarly held
that the second prong of the defense is inapplicable when the employer
takes “swift and effective action the minute it learns of a single incident
159
of supervisor sexual harassment.”
B. Courts That Have Refused to Drop the Second Prong
Some courts continue to apply both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher
defense in all circumstances without issue. Thus far, the Tenth Circuit is
the only federal appeals court to expressly refuse to drop the second
160
prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in any circumstance, but this
decision has been reflected in concurring and dissenting opinions from
161
162
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and has been endorsed by the EEOC.
158. Van Alstyne, 8 F. App’x at 153. A judge in another circuit established a similar
standard in which employer liability revolves around whether the employer took prompt
remedial action:
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A court’s assessment as to whether a defendant has proved this defense requires,
first, an analysis of whether the employer has exercised reasonable care in
preventing sexual harassing behavior. The court next directs its inquiry to whether
the employee made reasonably sufficient use of available avenues to put the
employer on notice of the problem. Finally, the court refocuses on the employer to
determine whether the employer or its authorized agent, after receiving notice of
the harassment, took adequate steps to abate it and prevent its recurrence.
Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J., concurring
specially). This concurrence is not controlling precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, but it is
often cited for its articulation of a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense. Jeannine Novak, Note,
“Let’s Be Reasonable”—Resolving the Ambiguities of the Faragher-Ellerth Affirmative
Defense, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 211, 224 (2001).
159. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2004). A district court
case similarly concluded that the issue of employer liability should not come down to when,
or if, the employee reported the harassment when the plaintiff was a post office worker who
had been harassed by her supervisor for over a year. Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d
502, 506, 513 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (“[F]ocusing on the preventative measures an employer has in
place and the remedial action taken by the employer once it is notified of a problem avoids a
determination of liability based simply on when the employee reports the harassment.”).
160. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. 248 F.3d 1014, 1025–26 (10th Cir. 2001); Gunnell
v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998).
161. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 774–76 (Melloy, J., dissenting); Todd v. Ortho Biotech,
Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (Arnold, J., concurring); Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 798
(5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
162. EEOC, No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON VICARIOUS EMPLOYER
LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, (June 18, 1999) [hereinafter
EEOC GUIDELINES], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html. Another
source, Cause of Action for Supervisor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII (42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e) with Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defenses, seems to take the same approach as the
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Relevant EEOC Guidelines remark:
Harassment is the only type of discrimination carried out by a
supervisor for which an employer can avoid liability, and that
limitation must be construed narrowly. The employer will be
shielded from liability for harassment by a supervisor only if it
proves that it exercised reasonable care in preventing and
correcting the harassment and that the employee unreasonably
failed to avoid all of the harm. If both parties exercise
163
reasonable care, the defense will fail.
The courts that refuse to drop the second prong of the defense find
that even in single-incident or rapid-onset cases where an employer took
prompt remedial action, an employer will not be shielded from liability
164
if the employee reported the harassment. Courts justify applying both
prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense based on its plain language and
165
straightforwardness as articulated in the Supreme Court opinions and
because nothing in either case indicated that the defense was to be fact166
specific.
Additionally, some courts rebut the argument that the
167
defense is unfair by reasoning that it can be used to reduce damages.
1. Plain Language and Straightforwardness of the Defense
Courts that apply both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in all
situations note that doing so is necessary based on the defense’s plain
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EEOC, noting that the courts applying a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense have “strangely
bypassed the second prong, holding that the employer need not prove the second prong of the
affirmative defense when the first prong is satisfied,” but makes no other comments about it.
Cause of Action for Supervisor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e) with
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defenses, 54 C.O.A. 2d 365 § 37 (Oct. 2012) (citing Jaudon v.
Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Md. 2000)).
163. EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 162, at Part V-B.
164. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1261 (“Under Faragher and . . . [Ellerth], an employer whose
supervisory personnel has harassed subordinates will be liable for the harassment that
occurred even though the employer ultimately stopped further harassment.”). In Gunnell,
the director of maintenance/custodial services had been making unwanted sexual comments
to a secretary. Id. at 1257. The court remanded the case in light of the standards established
in Ellerth and Faragher, and advised the lower court that the relevant inquiries were whether
the employer had a reasonable policy in place to prevent and correct sexual harassment and
whether the plaintiff had unreasonably failed to take advantage of such policy. Id. at 1261.
This approach has been described as the “opposite approach from Indest.” Novak, supra note
158, at 225. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text for more information about Indest
I’s reasoning.
165. See infra Part III.B.1.
166. See infra Part III.B.2.
167. See infra Part III.B.3.
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language and straightforwardness. Because of the plain language of the
defense, these courts believe that the defense is clear on its face as a
“remarkably straightforward framework” and thus requires an employer
to prove both prongs in order to avoid liability for supervisory
168
harassment.
Specifically, courts cite that the defense uses the words
169
“necessary” and “and” on its face.
The concurring opinion to Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc. (Indest
170
II) cited this rationale. Judge Wiener’s concurring opinion criticized
171
Judge Jones’s interpretation of the Ellerth/Fargher defense and
172
countered that the defense is unambiguous. Judge Wiener noted the
“straight-forward and unqualified bright-line rules” established by the
Court and emphasized the words “two necessary elements” from the
173
defense. As the Tenth Circuit has succinctly concluded, “there is no
reason to believe that the ‘remarkably straightforward’ framework
outlined in Faragher and [Ellerth] does not control all cases in which a
plaintiff employee seeks to hold his or her employer vicariously liable
174
Judge Melloy, the dissenting
for a supervisor’s sexual harassment.”
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168. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Indest II,
168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring)); see also Chapman v.
Carmike Cinemas, 307 F. App’x 164, 170 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e continue to require that the
employer prove the employee did not promptly report the single-incident offense before the
employer may avail itself of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.”).
169. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (“The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.” (emphasis added)). Additionally, some commentators think it is clear that the
mere availability of an affirmative defense thwarts the argument that employers are held
strictly liable in instances of supervisory harassment. Shachter, supra note 104, at 582.
170. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 795 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
171. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text for a description of Judge Jones’s
lead opinion. Judge Wiener criticized Judge Jones’s opinion as a substitution of “her own
balancing test in lieu of the Court’s,” a complete disregard of the two-pronged defense, and
“as neat an illusion as any sleight-of-hand artist ever created.” Indest II, 168 F.3d at 798
(Wiener, J., specially concurring). Harrison similarly disregards Judge Jones’s reasoning
because it was written by one judge on a panel of three, another judge on the panel expressly
rejected it, and the opinion did not have precedential value in the Fifth Circuit. Harrison, 248
F.3d at 1025.
172. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 796 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
173. Id. at 800.
174. Harrison, 248 F.3d at 1026 (citing Indest II, 168 F.3d at 796 (Wiener, J., specially
concurring)). In Harrison, a supervisor in the potash mines harassed the plaintiff by
repeatedly taking her to isolated areas in the mines, touching her in a sexual manner, and
forcing her to masturbate him. Id. at 1016–17. About two months after the start of the
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judge in McCurdy, similarly focused on the conjunctive “and” between
the two prongs of the defense and determined that it was “remarkably
175
clear” that both prongs must be applied. These opinions found that to
avoid liability, an employer has to prove both prongs of the
176
Ellerth/Faragher defense in all situations.
2. Ellerth/Faragher Defense is Not Fact Specific
The courts in favor of applying both prongs of the defense note that
177
nothing in the Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth or Faragher v. City
178
of Boca Raton opinions suggest that there are any exceptions to the
defense’s application regardless of any factual distinctions between
179
These
Ellerth and Faragher and single-incident or rapid-onset cases.
courts argue that if the Supreme Court had intended to create an
exception based on factual distinctions, it would have said so in the
opinions rather than using broad, all-encompassing language in the
180
defense.
Despite factual differences, these courts maintain that the
defense was created to apply to all instances of supervisory harassment.
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harassment, Harrison reported the inappropriate behavior to a manager who took immediate
action, including separating the two employees; promising to place the supervisor on
permanent probation for any future, similar behavior; and promising that Harrison would be
“made whole.” Id. at 1018. In court, the defendant attempted to escape vicarious liability for
the supervisor’s conduct by arguing that Indest I had correctly modified the Ellerth/Faragher
defense such that employers that take immediate corrective action can avoid liability. Id. at
1024. The court rejected the modified defense from Indest I, noting that the opinion did not
have precedential value even in the Fifth Circuit, and reiterated the straightforwardness of
the defense in requiring the application of both prongs. Id. at 1025–26. The court affirmed
the district court’s holding in favor of the plaintiff because the employer failed to fulfill the
first prong of the defense by not properly disseminating its anti-harassment policy. Id. at
1027–28.
175. See McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 775 (8th Cir. 2004) (Melloy, J.,
dissenting) (citing Indest II, 168 F.3d at 796 (Wiener, J., specially concurring)).
176. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 775 (Melloy, J., dissenting); Indest II, 168 F.3d at 796
(Wiener, J., specially concurring).
177. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
178. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
179. Commentators have also reflected this idea. See Shachter, supra note 104, at 583
(“Simply put, there is no indication that the Supreme Court intended . . . [a] limited scope [of
the defense]. On the contrary, the affirmative defense reads more like a universal code than
malleable, context-specific common-law.” (footnote omitted)).
180. See Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D. Ind. 2011);
Garrison, supra note 113, at 1149; G. Dain Stewart, Affirmative Defenses—Can an Employer
Ever Avoid Liability for a Single Act of Sexual Harassment?—Alalade v. AWS Assistance
Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Ind. 2011), 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 429, 436 (2011) (“[T]he
Supreme Court did not purposely create exceptions to the applicability of the
Ellerth/Faragher’s second prong.”).
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For example, in his concurring opinion in Indest II, Judge Wiener
argued that the Supreme Court crafted the Ellerth/Faragher defense to
cover “the entire spectrum of an employer’s vicarious liability under
182
While courts that
Title VII for supervisory harassment writ large.”
have dropped the second prong suggest that the defense was intended to
cover “some lesser fragment of that statutory problem,” namely ongoing
harassment only, Judge Wiener found that in neither the Ellerth nor the
Faragher opinions did the Court “even remotely hint that it is limiting its
183
analysis.”
Judge Wiener cited the opening language of the Ellerth opinion as
support for the idea that the defense is all-encompassing:
We decide whether . . . an employee who refuses unwelcome and
threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no
adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the
employer without showing the employer is negligent or
184
otherwise at fault for the supervisor’s actions.
Because of the broad and inclusive language from the Court in the
opening paragraph, the lack of limiting language in the two opinions,
and the plain language of the two-pronged defense, some courts and
judges have concluded that they “cannot read anything in
Ellerth/Faragher that creates an exception to the two prong affirmative
defense for those cases of single incident harassment that do rise to the
185
level of actionable harassment,” and have rejected the idea that factual
186
distinctions justify modifying the defense.

01/13/2014 11:22:05

C M
Y K

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 101 Side B

181. Indest II, 168 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
182. Id. at 798.
183. Id. The Supreme Court recently invoked this consideration in an analogous
situation. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443, 2448 (2013). In the context of
the definition of a supervisor, the Court stated that “[t]here is no hint in either Ellerth or
Faragher that the Court contemplated anything other than a unitary category of supervisors.”
Id. at 2448. The Supreme Court seems to be suggesting that if the Court were to limit its
analysis, or expected a rule to be applied differently from how the Court laid it out, it would
have said something to that effect within the opinion.
184. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 799 (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (citing Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746–47 (1998)).
185. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 775 (8th Cir. 2004) (Melloy, J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., Indest II, 168 F.3d 795 (Wiener, J., specially concurring); Alalade v. AWS
Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
186. See supra Part III.B.
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3. Defense Can Reduce Damages
Courts in favor of applying both prongs of the defense also reject the
argument that the Ellerth/Faragher defense is unfair to employers.
Courts in favor of dropping the second prong argue that the defense,
when applied in full, is unfair to employers who have done everything in
their power to prevent and correct harassment because the defense
187
nonetheless imputes liability if the employee reported the harassment.
However, because the defense was intended to be an “affirmative
188
defense to liability or damages,” courts applying both prongs of the
defense counter-argue that the defense is not unfair because an
employer’s successful fulfillment of the first prong of the defense
189
partially mitigates damages imposed on the employer.
Therefore, employers still have an incentive to fulfill the first prong
of the defense to the fullest (preventing and promptly correcting any
sexual harassment reported to them) in order to mitigate their
190
damages. Additionally, employers are incentivized to institute formal
(and effective) reporting policies in the interest of preventing an
actionable hostile work environment from developing in the first
191
place. As the EEOC has recognized, “an employer’s quick remedial
action will often thwart the creation of an unlawful hostile [work]
192
environment.”
In this light, the defense serves Title VII’s deterrent
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187. See supra Part III.A.3.
188. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added); Faragher v. City Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 807 (1998) (emphasis added); Grossman, supra note 87, at 707 (“[T]he best reading of
these opinions with respect to the affirmative defense is that in some cases the defense should
avoid liability and in some it should reduce damages.”).
189. One judge stated, “If a supervisor abuses his authority to commit a sufficiently
severe act of harassment, the employer’s affirmative defense, if established, should serve to
reduce the damages, but I don’t understand why it should always erase the tort completely.”
Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (Arnold, J., concurring). Judge
Melloy agreed that “the taking of prompt and effective remedial action may mitigate
damages; however, it does not create a complete defense to liability.” McCurdy, 375 F.3d at
776 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
190. Lawton, supra note 15, at 207.
191. EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 162, at Part V-B n.46; Grossman, supra note 87, at
713 (“[T]he employer will not face liability where it responded promptly and effectively
because its actions will stymie the maturation of the hostile environment.”). In addition,
Judge Melloy believes that the concerns about unfairness are greatly exaggerated, as “many,
if not [in] most cases, a single incidence of harassment, or . . . incidences that occur over less
than an hour’s time, will not normally rise to the level of being sufficiently severe and
pervasive to constitute actionable harassment.” McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 775 (Melloy, J.,
dissenting).
192. EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 162, at Part V-B n.46.
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purpose because the first prong of the defense motivates employers to
have an effective anti-harassment policy and reporting mechanism that
“encourage[s] employees to report harassing conduct before it
193
[becomes] severe or pervasive.” Therefore, some courts believe that
the defense has a fair and useful purpose for employers, even if it does
not completely immunize them from liability in some instances. The
defense encourages employers to implement effective anti-harassment
policies, which in turn rewards them by preventing severe actionable
hostile work environments from occurring. Additionally, the defense
works to mitigate damages on the rare occasion that an actionable claim
does arise.
C. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corporation
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193. Lawton, supra note 15, at 207 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764).
194. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
195. Id. at 937; see also supra Part I.
196. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 938.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 938. The opinion notes that this issue was raised for the first time in the
motion for reconsideration. Id.
199. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit has not yet voiced its opinion in support of
either side of the circuit split; however, a district court within the
Seventh Circuit has recently spoken on the issue in Alalade v. AWS
194
Assistance Corp. In Alalade, the plaintiff was physically and sexually
195
assaulted by her supervisor.
Four days later, Alalade submitted a
written complaint to her employer, and as a result, her supervisor was
196
terminated. Because Alalade promptly reported the harassment, the
court concluded that the employer could not satisfy the second prong of
the Ellerth/Faragher defense and denied its motion for summary
197
judgment.
However, the case did not end there. Alalade’s employer requested
that the judge reconsider his denial of summary judgment on the basis
that other courts had held that employers are not required to satisfy the
198
second prong of the defense in all cases.
Essentially, the employer
argued that the court should apply a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense.
The court acknowledged the existence of the circuit split and found this
to be a compelling reason to reconsider the denial of AWS’s motion for
199
The employer in Alalade argued that the
summary judgment.
application of the second prong in this case was inappropriate because it
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200. Id. at 940.
201. Id. at 940–43.
202. Id. at 946. There has been no appeal filed in this case.
203. Id. at 940; see also Garrison, supra note 113, at 1149; Stewart, supra note 180, at 436
(noting that “the Supreme Court did not purposely create exceptions to the applicability of
the Ellerth/Faragher’s second prong”).
204. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 940.
205. Id. at 944.
206. Id.
207. Stewart, supra note 180, at 436.
208. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 944.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 944–45; Stewart, supra note 180, at 436.
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would result in strict liability for the employer, conflicting with the
200
holding from Meritor.
The court reviewed McCurdy, Indest I, and
201
Harrison, which were pertinent to the employer’s arguments. Despite
these arguments and the opinions that supported them, the court upheld
202
its previous denial of summary judgment for four main reasons.
First, the court said that there is no reason for “single
instance . . . cases . . . to be treated any differently” than ongoing
203
harassment cases. The court concluded that Ellerth and Faragher do
not indicate that single-incident cases are to be treated as an exception,
stating “[t]he Supreme Court has laid out a simple and easy to apply
204
Second, the
two-part test, and my job [as a judge] is to follow it.”
Alalade court stated that the defendant’s argument had essentially the
205
same force in pervasive cases as in single-incident cases.
That is, an
employee’s report of the harassment can prevent the availability of the
affirmative defense for the employer just as easily in single-incident
cases as in ongoing cases, so the distinction courts have made between
206
And in either situation, the
these two types of cases is irrelevant.
existence of the affirmative defense is enough to thwart the argument
207
that the court is imposing strict liability on employers.
Third, the court concluded that the defendant’s argument would
208
“create[] an exception that swallows the Ellerth/Faragher rule.” The
defendant argued that it should have to prove only the first prong of the
defense, because in doing so it has shown that it did everything in its
power to prevent and correct the harassment—namely, that it had an
209
anti-harassment policy in place. The court rejected this logic because
210
endorsing it would “eviscerate rather than merely modify the rule.”
Lastly, the court recognized that limiting the defense to its first prong
would defeat Title VII’s purpose of mitigating damages and encouraging
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211

employees to avoid further harm.
The court also noted that the full
defense encourages employees to report the harassment early, which
212
can prevent a hostile work environment from ever arising.
As articulated in Alalade, the Seventh Circuit has yet to address the
213
circuit split over the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.
Because the application of the defense is a “key issue” in determining
214
liability in cases involving supervisor harassment, it is an imminent and
timely problem for the Seventh Circuit to resolve.
IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT PREDICTIONS
Despite seeing thirteen supervisory harassment cases over the five215
year period of 1998–2003, the Seventh Circuit has yet to choose a side
216
217
in this circuit split.
As harassment filings continue to rise, it is
increasingly likely that the Seventh Circuit will be faced with this issue
218
For this reason, practitioners should be
again in the near future.
informed about the split and the stance that the Seventh Circuit is likely
to take on it.
In order to make a prediction about how the Seventh Circuit will
come out on this split, this Comment examines three considerations.
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211. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 945. One commentator notes that “the problem with
dropping the second prong . . . is that it ignores a key player in the harassment context: the
employee.” Colin Miller, Everything But the Girl: Northern District of Indiana Opinion
Sharpens Split over Nature of Affirmative Defense in Single-Instance Harassment Cases,
FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS (July 27, 2011), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/07/e
verything-girl-northern-district-indiana-opinion-sharpens-split-nature-affirmative-defensesingle-instance-harassment-cases/.
212. Garrison, supra note 113, at 1149; Stewart, supra note 180, at 436; Miller, supra note
211.
213. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 938.
214. Id.
215. See supra note 16.
216. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 938.
217. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
218. The Seventh Circuit must accept all cases that are correctly appealed to it. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006); The Appeals Process, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.go
v/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/TheAppealsProcess.aspx
(last visited Nov. 23, 2013). It is more likely that the Seventh Circuit will be faced with this
issue, see Practitioner’s Handbook for Appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, (noting “[t]he large and ever-growing number of appeals”), available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/rules/handbook.pdf 11 (2012), before the Supreme Court grants
certiorari to decide it. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in only seventy-eight cases in
the 2011–2012 term. 2011 Term Opinions of the Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=11 (last visited Nov.
23, 2013).
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First, the Seventh Circuit adheres to precedent and hesitates to deviate
219
from Supreme Court precedent without good reason. Second, district
court case law on the split shows that lower courts within the circuit are
220
continuing to apply the standard in full. Last, this Section argues that
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis and rationale in another recent circuit
split, involving the Vance decision, is readily applicable and informative
221
This Section
as to how the Seventh Circuit will decide this split.
concludes with a prediction that the Seventh Circuit will reject the
modified Ellerth/Faragher defense and will apply both prongs of the
defense in all factual scenarios.
A. The Seventh Circuit and Precedent
While a relatively obvious point, consideration should be given to
the Seventh Circuit’s history of strict adherence to precedent. Although
the Supreme Court’s holdings serve as mandatory authority on each of
222
the circuits, some circuits have found justifications for deviating from
223
the precedent established in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and
224
225
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton nonetheless.
However, it seems
unlikely that the Seventh Circuit will follow in their footsteps. In Heath
226
v. Varity Corp., the Seventh Circuit Court cautioned that “[t]o avoid
heaping needless costs and delay on the litigants, a district court should
apply existing precedents while explaining why it believes that
innovation is in order. Courts of appeals that believe decisions of the
227
Supreme Court to be mistaken are under identical marching orders.”
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219. See infra Part IV.A.
220. See infra Part IV.B.
221. See infra Part IV.C.
222. David C. Bratz, Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of
Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 87 (1984) (“The proposition that lower
federal courts must follow Supreme Court precedent evokes little controversy.”). However,
Bratz suggests that lower federal courts occasionally find ways to skirt Supreme Court
precedent, id., a pertinent observation to the issue in this Comment.
223. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
224. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
225. See supra Part III.A.
226. Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1995).
227. Id. at 257 (citation omitted). Similar to its decision in Heath, the Seventh Circuit
faithfully followed Supreme Court precedent in Khan v. State Oil Co. (Khan I), 93 F.3d 1358
(7th Cir. 1996), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan (Khan II), 522 U.S. 3 (1997), even though
the court thought that the precedent was unsound and inconsistent. In Khan I, the Court
followed Supreme Court precedent established in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968),
“despite all its infirmities, its increasingly wobbly, [and] moth-eaten foundations.” Khan I, 93
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228

This directive also appears in Gacy v. Welborn, where the Seventh
Circuit noted: “Ours is a hierarchical judiciary, and judges of inferior
229
courts must carry out decisions they believe mistaken.”
This rationale suggests that the Seventh Circuit would be more likely
to apply the Ellerth/Faragher defense in its entirety, as that is how the
Supreme Court established the defense. If the Seventh Circuit had any
reservations about the defense’s applicability or conformance with
precedent, it would follow the defense as established by the Supreme
Court but may include comments and critiques as dicta, as “[the court is]
bound to follow a decision of the Supreme Court unless [it is] powerfully
230
convinced that the Court would overrule it at the first opportunity.”
While the Seventh Circuit should give the “most respectful
231
consideration to the decisions of the other courts of appeals,” the
Seventh Circuit will still likely decide to apply both prongs of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense as the Supreme Court drafted it without more
conclusive evidence that the Court intended to create an exception for
single-incident cases.
B. District Courts Within the Seventh Circuit After Ellerth/Faragher
In the circuits that have decided to drop the second prong of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense in some cases, generally the court of appeals of
232
that circuit did so first and then district courts followed suit.
Additionally, in those instances, the court of appeals made the decision
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F.3d at 1363. Also, the court noted that “the Supreme Court has told the lower federal
courts, in increasingly emphatic, even strident, terms, not to anticipate an overruling of a
decision by the Court; we are leaving the overruling to the Court itself.” Id. The Supreme
Court later commended the Seventh Circuit when it granted certiorari, for this case: “The
Court of Appeals was correct in applying that principle despite disagreement with Albrecht,
for it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” Khan II, 522 U.S. at
20 (1997).
228. Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993).
229. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
230. Colby v. J. C. Penney, Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 F. App’x 147 (2d Cir. 2001)
(applying a modified defense); Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d 439, No. 98–2555,
1999 WL 1032614 *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion)
(adopting a modified defense); Cajamarca v. Regal Entm’t Grp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 237
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (adopting Van Alstyne’s modified approach); Yerry v. Pizza Hut of Se. Kan.,
186 F. Supp. 2d 178 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (adopting Van Alstyne’s modified approach); Jaudon v.
Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Md. 2000) (adopting Watkins’s modified
approach); Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (adopting Watkins’s
modified approach).
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to drop the second prong soon after the Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
233
234
235
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton decisions came down.
Such patterns are not found within the Seventh Circuit. While the
Seventh Circuit has stayed silent on this circuit split, district courts
within the circuit have overwhelmingly continued to apply both prongs
236
of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. One district court has even advocated
237
for the application of both prongs of the defense despite a lack of clear
directive from the Seventh Circuit.
The first time a district court within the Seventh Circuit encountered
the issue of vicarious liability for supervisor harassment, post-Ellerth
238
and Faragher, was in Fall v. Indiana University Board of Trustees. Fall
involved a single incident of severe harassment in which a chancellor of
239
a university sexually assaulted an employee in his office. Fall reported
240
The court recited the
the harassment three months later.
Ellerth/Faragher defense exactly as stated by the Supreme Court and
241
applied both prongs to the facts at hand.
The court denied the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to take advantage of the defendant’s corrective
242
opportunities or to otherwise avoid harm. Although this case involved
a single, severe incident of sexual harassment of the kind some courts
would consider unavoidable by the employer and a case for the
modified defense, the district court did not hesitate in applying both
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233. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
234. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
235. The Ellerth and Faragher cases were decided June 26, 1998. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742;
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775. The Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits deviated from the defense
in 1999. See, e.g., Watkins, 201 F.3d 439, 1999 WL 1032614; Indest I, 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.
1999); Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1999).
236. See, e.g., Stanfield v. Dart, No. 10C6569, 2012 WL 6720433 at *6–9 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
27, 2012); Mueller v. McGrath Lexus of Chi., No. 02C0021, 2003 WL 21688230, at *5, *9 (N.D.
Ill. July 17, 2003); Finnane v. Pentel of Am., Ltd., No. 98C5187, 99C0189, 2000 WL 288437, at
*10–11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2000).
237. See Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
238. Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
239. Id. at 873.
240. Id. at 884.
241. Id. at 876, 880–84.
242. Id. at 884. The court held that because the plaintiff had waited three months before
reporting the harassment, it was unclear as to whether she had reasonably taken advantage of
the employer’s reporting mechanisms. Id. Ultimately, a jury awarded the plaintiff $800,000
in punitive damages and $5,157 in compensatory damages. Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 729, 733 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
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243

prongs of the defense.
In a more recent case, the Northern District Court of Illinois applied
both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense to an incident of sexual
244
245
harassment at a sheriff’s office.
In Stanfield v. Dart, a supervisor
called the plaintiff into his office on four occasions for massages and on
246
one of those occasions sexually assaulted her. A few months after this
incident, Stanfield reported the conduct to a sexual harassment
coordinator who encouraged her to file a written complaint, which she
247
did eight months after the supervisor began harassing her. The district
248
court applied both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in full. The
question of employer liability in this case revolved around the
application of the second prong—whether the plaintiff had correctly
249
utilized her employer’s reporting mechanisms. The court stated that a
plaintiff “satisf[ies] her obligation to avoid the harm” when she
“adequately alert[s] her employer to the harassment,” which the court
believed she did in this case by filing a written formal complaint in
250
compliance with the employer’s reporting process. Again, the district
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243. A district court within the Seventh Circuit encountered this issue again in Finnane
v. Pentel of America, Ltd., No. 98C5187, 99C0189, 2000 WL 288437 *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14,
2000). The court considered whether vicarious liability was appropriate for two instances of
supervisory harassment consisting of unwanted touching taking place in the same night. Id. at
*6. The court laid out the defense as it was crafted by the Supreme Court and ultimately
decided that the employer was entitled to the affirmative defense because the employee failed
to use the employer’s harassment reporting policy. Id. at *7, *10–11. Liability in this case
revolved around the application of the second prong; however, the court applied both prongs
of the defense and did not mention the possibility of a modified defense in which the second
prong was inapplicable. Id. at *10–11.
244. Stanfield v. Dart, No. 10 C 6569, 2012 WL 6720433, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27,
2012).
245. Stanfield, 2012 WL 6720433, at *1.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *1–2.
248. Id. at *5–10.
249. Id. at *8–9.
250. Id. at *9. Although waiting an extended of period of time before filing a complaint
can sometimes constitute an unreasonable delay in reporting, in this case the employer’s
harassment policy gave victims 365 days to file a report, so Stanfield’s complaint eight months
after the first incident was within that window. Id. at *2, *9. In a contrasting case, a district
court from the Seventh Circuit held in Mueller v. McGrath Lexus of Chicago, that the
employer was entitled to the affirmative defense after an employee reported receiving
sexually explicit phone calls from her supervisor on two occasions. Mueller v. McGrath
Lexus of Chi., No. 02C0021, 2003 WL 21688230, at *2, *10 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2003). The
employee reported the harassment, leading the employer to meet with the harasser and
institute a “zero tolerance policy” after which the harassment ceased, but the victimized
employee quit a few months later. Id. at *2–4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
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court did not question the use of both prongs of the defense and
emphasized that an employee’s report of harassment was enough to
satisfy the second prong.
Therefore, the only district court case from the Seventh Circuit that
has directly addressed the circuit split over the second prong of the
251
The other district court
defense is Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.
opinions from this circuit that have encountered the issue of vicarious
liability in single-incident cases have applied both prongs of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense without questioning the defense’s fairness or
applicability. This pattern may be persuasive for the Seventh Circuit
252
when it first faces this issue. It may also be relevant that the Seventh
Circuit has remained silent on this issue up until this point. This silence
could be implicit approval of the district court’s application of applying
both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in all instances.
C. Analogy to the Recently Resolved Split in Vance v. Ball State
University
Recently, the Seventh Circuit weighed in on another circuit split
regarding the Ellerth/Faragher defense: the split over the definition of
supervisor. The Circuit’s reasoning in that split provides some guidance
as to how the Seventh Circuit would resolve the circuit split over the
second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. Regarding the recently
resolved circuit split, the Seventh Circuit determined the definition of

01/13/2014 11:22:05

C M
Y K

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 106 Side A

applied the second prong of the defense and held that the plaintiff had unreasonably failed to
take advantage of her employer’s corrective opportunities by quitting her job; thus, the
employer was not liable. Id. at *7, *9–10. Although this court applied the Ellerth/Faragher
defense as a complete defense to liability, the Supreme Court designed the defense to be a
“defense to liability or damages.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). It appears that Mueller would have
been an appropriate case for the affirmative defense to limit damages but not function as a
complete bar to liability. The court could have awarded the plaintiff damages for the sex
harassment, as she immediately reported it, thus fulfilling the second prong of the defense.
One commentator suggests that using the defense as a complete bar to liability in all
situations is a way for lower courts to appear as if they are applying the full defense while
actually subtly modifying it. See Novak, supra note 158, at 223–24. It is unclear whether this
was the court’s intention in Mueller.
251. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011); see also
supra Part III.C.
252. Similarly, the district court’s opinion in Keefer likely influenced the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in McCurdy. See supra notes 112, 116, 126–28 and accompanying text. This may also
come to be the case in the Ninth Circuit where the district court’s opinion in Asia Pacific
Hotels could influence the court of appeals in the future. See EEOC v. Asia Pac. Hotels, Inc.,
No. 10-00002, 2011 WL 3841601 (D. N. Mar. I. Aug. 26, 2011).

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 106 Side B

01/13/2014 11:22:05

NEALS 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

204

12/3/2013 1:59 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[97:1

C M
Y K

01/13/2014 11:22:05

253. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 470 (7th Cir. 2011).
254. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id.; Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998).
258. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443.
259. Id. at 2443.
260. Id. at 2439.
261. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 506 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Parkins, 163
F.3d at 1034).
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supervisor by looking both to the plain language and intent of Title VII,
253
but also to Title VII’s practical purposes and the interpreting case law.
Applying that same logic to this circuit split over the application of the
affirmative defense in single-incident cases, it is likely that the Seventh
Circuit would come out in favor of applying the defense in its entirety in
order to stay true to the spirit behind the harassment laws.
Until June of 2013, a disagreement regarding the proper definition
of “supervisor” for the purposes of Title VII was splitting the courts.
Whether a harassing employee is a supervisor or not is a crucial
254
If a
distinction for the purposes of determining employer liability.
supervisor committed the harassment, the employer can avoid liability
255
If the
only by proving both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.
harasser was a co-worker, the employee can prevail by showing that the
256
employer was negligent in preventing the harassment. Thus, a court’s
interpretation of the definition of supervisor can greatly affect the
257
outcome of a case.
Before the Supreme Court clarified the split in its most recent term,
courts generally took one of two approaches to the definition of
supervisor. The more defined approach was that an employee is a
supervisor if he or she “has the power to hire, fire, demote, promote,
258
transfer, or discipline the victim.” The more “open-ended” definition
was that a person is a supervisor if he or she has the power to direct
259
The Seventh Circuit fell into the former
another’s daily activities.
group, the definition that was ultimately upheld by the Supreme
260
Court.
The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that an employee is a
supervisor only if that person had the power to “directly affect the terms
261
and conditions” of other employees’ work. Thus, the Seventh Circuit
generally deems a person a supervisor if that person has the authority to
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“hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.” The
Seventh Circuit made this final determination on the definition of
supervisor by looking at the plain language of Title VII, the inherent
263
meaning behind Title VII, and the relevant interpreting case law.
Although the definition of supervisor is not laid out in Title VII, the
264
Seventh Circuit in Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Illinois, Inc.
discerned its meaning by examining the underlying purposes and policy
265
guiding Title VII.
The court recognized that heightened employer
liability exists for supervisory harassment because the employer has
266
entrusted the supervisor with more power than the average employee.
For that reason, it was clear to the court that “the touchstone for
determining supervisory status is the extent of authority possessed by
the purported supervisor” and that authority is explicit when the
employee can “affect the terms and conditions” of others’
267
employment.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision on the supervisor circuit split has
similarities to the split currently at issue over the second prong of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense. Its ultimate decision and corresponding
rationale in the resolved split suggest that the Seventh Circuit would
side with the courts that refuse to drop the second prong in any
circumstances. In the supervisor split, the term at issue was not
explicitly defined. Therefore, the court had to determine the relative
importance of available sources. The court chose to look closely at the
plain language of Title VII, the policies guiding it, the common law of
agency that inspired it, and the case law—Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
268
269
270
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton —that interpreted it.
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262. Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002).
263. See Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032–33.
264. Parkins, 163 F.3d 1027.
265. Id. at 1033.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1033–34. The Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit’s approach. Vance
v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). The Court emphasized that the Ellerth/Faragher
defense was crafted to be “workable,” and adopting the more liberal definition of supervisor
would be “murky” and be difficult to consistently apply. Id. at 2448–49. The Court also
noted that the Ellerth/Faragher defense was designed to appropriately and fairly take into
account the interests of both the employer and the employee, which the Seventh Circuit’s
definition did more effectively than the competing approach. Id. at 2444.
268. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
269. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
270. Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1033.
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271. Id.
272. See id. at 1033–34.
273. See supra Parts II.B, III.
274. See, e.g., Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1033.
275. See supra Part IV.B.
276. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2444 (2013);
Shachter, supra note 104, at 582.
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The Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court imputes heightened
liability on employers in supervisory harassment cases under the
Ellerth/Faragher defense because the law of agency suggests that the tort
of harassment is aided by the employer’s decision to place him in a
271
position of authority.
The Seventh Circuit strove to stay true to the
spirit of that law behind Title VII and held that a person must truly be in
a position to be aided by his status in order to be a supervisor; that is, he
272
must have the heightened powers that a supervisor generally has.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit will likely use the spirit and principles
behind Title VII and the interpreting case law to make a conclusive
decision on the circuit split here. Ellerth and Faragher are silent as to
whether the affirmative defense excludes single-incident cases of
273
harassment. The Seventh Circuit should accordingly interpret the rule
in light of the plain language and spirit that inspired Title VII and the
274
defense and the interpreting case law. The Seventh Circuit has yet to
decide one way or the other on the circuit split, so it may first look to
275
district court opinions for guidance. But even if the court of appeals
does not accord value to the district court opinions, the plain language
and spirit inspiring Title VII and the affirmative defense should appear
clear to the Seventh Circuit. The rule uses the word “and” between its
two prongs and strives to represent a workable balance between the
276
interests of the employer and the employee.
Interpreting the rule differently in single-incident cases of
harassment would be completely contrary to the plain language of the
defense and the intent of Title VII. The Seventh Circuit would have to
reject the policy inspiring Title VII and affirmatively state that the
interests of the employer are superior to the interests of the employee in
single incidents of harassment in order to find that the second prong
should be dropped. Given the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in the
supervisor split, it is unlikely that the Seventh Circuit would be willing
to completely reject both the plain language and spirit of the law to hold
that there is a separate standard for single incidents of harassment.
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See supra Part III.A.3.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
See supra Part III.A.2.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742.
Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011).
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278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
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Based on these factors, it is likely that the Seventh Circuit will side
with the Tenth Circuit in this split and apply both prongs of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense in all relevant cases.
The three main
arguments advocated by courts in favor of dropping the second prong in
277
select cases are: fairness to employers, adherence with Meritor Savings
278
279
Bank, FSB v. Vinson’s prohibition of strict liability, and the factual
280
distinctions from the Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher
281
282
v. City of Boca Raton cases. However, it is unlikely that the Seventh
Circuit will find these arguments persuasive and instead will find that
the defense, as crafted by the Supreme Court, is binding precedent to be
followed in all cases.
First, the Seventh Circuit has come out in favor of adhering to
Supreme Court precedent unless it is absolutely sure that the Supreme
283
Court would overrule its own holding if given the chance. That finding
is not apparent in this split. Second, the circuit should look to various
district court holdings on this issue. The circuit will find that, uniformly,
district courts within the Seventh Circuit have continued to apply both
prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense as articulated by the Supreme
284
285
In fact, the court in Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp. has
Court.
expressly stated that applying both prongs of the defense is the proper
outcome. Third, as evidenced by the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in
286
Vance v. Ball State University and the preceding cases that interpreted
the definition of supervisor, the circuit will first likely examine the plain
language and reasoning behind the rule. As the rule is clear, containing
the words “and” and “necessary,” it would be unusual for the circuit to
find that there should be a modified affirmative defense in different
factual scenarios. Additionally, the circuit will look to the underlying
policy and spirit behind the rule. Because the Supreme Court created
the defense in order to promote reasonableness on behalf of the
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employer and the employee, the circuit should not deviate from this
precedent in order to create an alternative, more “fair” rule for
employers.
V. WHAT SHOULD THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DO?
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287. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443–44 (2013).
288. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
289. As one commentator noted: “[T]he Ellerth majority designed the affirmative
defense within the parameters of the Meritor precedent. Moreover, the affirmative defense,
by nature, erects a barrier to strict liability.” Shachter, supra note 104, at 582.
290. See supra notes 63–67, 90–97 and accompanying text.
291. Murr, supra note 87, at 609–11.
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The Seventh Circuit should continue to apply both prongs of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense in all instances of supervisory harassment.
First, as the Supreme Court has noted, the rule provides a proper
287
balance between the interests of the employer and the employee. The
employer is able to avoid strict liability per Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
288
289
v. Vinson purely by the existence of the defense.
The defense
recognizes that employers do not want to be liable for their supervisor’s
harassment of which they have no control over. However, this must be
balanced with the fact that the employee wants, and needs, retribution
for his or her harm. Additionally, the employee wants his or her
employer to exercise caution when placing people in positions of
authority and to continually oversee what is happening in its
workplaces. Based on these considerations, the Court created the
Ellerth/Faragher defense in order to promote reasonableness and
290
The
responsibility on the part of both the employer and employee.
employer must have anti-harassment policies and procedures in place,
but at the same time, employees must timely report harassment if it
happens to them. The expectations placed on employees under this
291
defense are in part inspired by the tort of avoidable consequences, but
ultimately work to benefit the employer as well. An employee should
not be able to hold his or her employer liable for supervisory
harassment that continued for an extended period of time if the
employer was never put on notice of the harassment—this is why the
defense requires employee reporting under the second prong.
Therefore, the defense, as crafted, adequately represents both the
interests of the employer and employee.
Second, if the Seventh Circuit adopted a separate rule in singleincident supervisory harassment cases, it would go against the Supreme
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Court’s desire to have a workable standard that could be “readily
292
applied” in cases of employer liability.
Implementing separate
standards in single-incident cases presents the problem of determining
which standard to apply, and when. In some cases it may be clear when
harassment is confined to a single incident, such as a rape that occurred
one time. However, courts have already begun to blur the line between
what is literally a single incident and what can be generalized as a single
293
This extension of a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense into
incident.
cases that are not obviously single incidents is disturbing in that the
practice suggests that courts may begin to abandon the second prong
altogether. This is a slippery slope, one that the Seventh Circuit should
294
avoid at all costs.
Third, the second prong of the defense serves as a useful check on
the first prong—the existence of an anti-harassment policy. In recent
times, most employers are smart enough to have an anti-harassment
policy in place; however, in reality the policy may be useless. For
example, a policy may exist but may not be distributed or accessible to
all employees, or the policy may provide only one illogical method of
295
In these cases, if the employer invokes the
reporting harassment.
Ellerth/Faragher defense, the employer may be able to prove the first
and second prong. However, in response to the second prong, the
employee-victim will be able to raise issues relating to the deficiency of
the reporting mechanism. In that way, the second prong serves as a
check on the practicality of the anti-harassment policy and brings these
issues to the forefront in court. A policy may look good on paper, and
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292. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449.
293. See supra note 112; see also infra note 304 and accompanying text.
294. Additionally, there is support for the argument that the second prong of the
defense functions exactly the same in both single-incident and ongoing cases and that an
endorsement to drop the prong in some cases is an endorsement to drop the prong in all
cases. The court in Alalade noted that regardless of whether harassment is ongoing or
confined to a single incident, an employee’s “quick action prevents the employer from
satisfying Ellerth/Faragher’s second prong.” Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp.
2d 936, 944 (N.D. Ind. 2011). The court argued that the application of a modified defense
“creates an exception that swallows the Ellerth/Faragher rule. . . . [T]he reasoning endorsed
by [the employer] actually supports dropping the second prong altogether whenever the
employer satisfies the first prong.” Id.
295. As was the case in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the employer had an antiharassment policy, but it was not distributed to all employees. Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998). Another example of a policy being unusable would be
where the policy requires reporting to the company’s human resources manager, but that
manager is the one committing the harassment.
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may even pass the first prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, but the
existence of the second prong gives the employee an opportunity to
show the court that the policy was insufficient. This alone is a worthy
purpose of the second prong.
Fourth, the bottom-line is that the burden and cost of the
supervisory harassment tort should fall on the employer rather than on
the employee. If the defense works out perfectly, wherein each party
does their respective duty, the defense is clear that the employer
296
Some courts fear that this is unfair to
remains responsible.
employers—they argue that an employer should not be liable merely
297
because an employee reports the harassment.
However, there are
many reasons why this result is nonetheless appropriate and reasonable.
The employer made the decision to promote the person to the position
298
of supervisor in the first place, in order to act vicariously on the part of
299
the employer. Being a supervisor comes with power. Employers need
to recognize that fact and exercise caution when hiring supervisors.
Employers should also continually do their due diligence to oversee how
their supervisors function in the workplace, both through the
supervisor’s professional work and through their interactions with
employees. Additionally, an employer can much more easily bear the
cost of the tort (payment to the plaintiff) than the victim, who will be
300
forced to suffer her harm without reparation. It is the cost of doing
business—employers should be responsible for any harm that they
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296. See Hébert, supra note 23, at 717; Shachter, supra note 104, at 582.
297. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d 439, No. 98-2555, 1999 WL
1032614, at *5 n.16 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision); EEOC
v. Asia Pac. Hotels, Inc., No. 10-00002, 2011 WL 3841601, at *5 (D. N. Mar. I. Aug. 26, 2011);
Lawton, supra note 15, at 245.
298. Hébert, supra note 23, at 717 (noting that it was the choice of the employer to “put
a sexual harasser in a position of authority that facilitated the harassment”).
299. Grover notes: “In most discrimination cases, supervisors are quintessentially agents
of the employer; a supervisor who discriminates in the course of taking an employment action
that is his or her job to take, is necessarily operating as the agent of the employer.” Susan
Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in Sexual Harassment Analysis, 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 810 (2002).
300. See Garrison, supra note 113, at 1152 (citing Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX,
7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 757 (1999)) (recognizing “Title VII’s policy of allowing
recovery from the ‘deep[er]-pocket[ed]’ employer”); Shachter, supra note 104, at 583–84
(“[E]mployers should be viewed as . . . the superior spreader or insurer of the costs of
discrimination . . . [and] the employer is in the superior position to . . . spread the risk more
evenly across society.”(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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301

directly, or indirectly, cause.
Hence, courts that apply a modified Ellerth/Faragher defense in
certain situations are ignoring the plain language and intent of the rule
at the expense of the innocent employee-victims. Employees deserve to
be protected in their workplaces, and the reality is that sometimes a
mere anti-harassment policy does not ensure this protection. Employers
need to be responsible for whom they promote to the position of
supervisor and be knowledgeable about what is happening in their
workplaces. The Seventh Circuit should examine the spirit and policy
considerations behind Title VII and recognize that the Supreme Court
acknowledged all of the arguments offered by courts who dropped the
second prong, yet the Court chose to reject them all in favor of crafting
a straightforward standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
In creating the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, the Supreme
Court wanted to avoid imposing strict liability on employers while still
requiring more than the negligence standard that courts had been
employing. Some courts are not satisfied with this defense, arguing that
in single-instance cases it fails to avoid strict liability and is unfair to
302
Since the modified Ellerth/Faragher defense appeared in
employers.
single-instance cases, some courts have traveled down the slippery slope
303
and expanded the rationale even further to rapid-onset, incipient, and
304
Other courts and circuits have rejected this
even ongoing cases.
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301. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) (“[O]ne might justify
the assignment of the burden of the untoward behavior to the employer as one of the costs of
doing business, to be charged to the enterprise rather than the victim.”); Harper & Flynn,
supra note 57, at 253; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500 (1961).
302. See supra Parts III.A.2–3.
303. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 F. App’x 147 (2d Cir. 2001) (plaintiff
was harassed for eight months and reported the harassment, but employer was entitled
immunity because it took swift action in responding to the plaintiff’s complaint); Coates v.
Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1362–63, 1367–69 (11th Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J., concurring
specially) (plaintiff suffered harassment for over a year, but the concurring judge advocated
for a modified defense); Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153, 157, 164 (D. Md.
2000) (plaintiff suffered inappropriate comments and physical contact on a number of
occasions, but employer was immune from liability for taking prompt remedial action upon
plaintiff’s complaint); Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (plaintiff
was harassed for over a year, but the employer could avail itself of the defense because it
promptly responded to the harassment).
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305. See supra Parts III.B.1–2.
306. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 938 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
307. See supra Part IV.A.
308. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
309. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
310. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d 936.
311. See Grossman, supra note 87, at 708 (“Applied correctly, the Faragher and Ellerth
rule should result in vicarious liability for the employer under some circumstances (a single,
severe act of harassment) regardless of the fact that the employer may have responded
adequately to stop the harassment and prevent further occurrences.”); Hébert, supra note 23,
at 717 (“[The defense is] the appropriate allocation of liability between an employee who has
been sexually harassed and the employer who has put a sexual harasser in a position of
authority that facilitated the harassment.”); Shachter, supra note 104, at 582 (“[T]he
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modified defense, instead holding that the Supreme Court was clear in
crafting a defense that considered the interests of the employer and
305
employee and which was intended to apply in all cases. The Seventh
306
Circuit has not yet voiced its opinion in support of either side.
Overall, it is more likely that the Seventh Circuit will side with the
Tenth Circuit in applying both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense
than with courts such as the Eighth and Fifth Circuits in dropping the
second prong in certain cases. First, the Seventh Circuit is reluctant to
307
The
deviate from precedent unless there is a clear reason to do so.
Supreme Court has established precedent in the Burlington Industries,
308
309
Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton cases, and unless
the Seventh Circuit is willing to completely disregard the plain language
and intent of the rule, it will likely apply both prongs of the rule going
forward. Second, the circuit may look to district courts’ decisions
following the appearance of the split. District courts within the Seventh
Circuit have consistently continued to apply both prongs of the defense,
310
explicitly
with one court in Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.
addressing the issue and arguing that all courts should be applying both
prongs of the defense. Third, an analogy to another circuit split
regarding sex harassment law suggests that the Seventh Circuit will look
to the plain language of the rule and Title VII as well as invoking the
policy and meaning behind them. For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit
will likely come out in support of courts that have refused to drop the
second prong in single-incident cases.
This conclusion is the right conclusion. The defense adequately
balances the interests of the employer versus the employee and comes
out appropriately in favor of the employee when both parties act
311
The burden of the tort should not fall on the innocent
responsibly.
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employee, especially when the employer is not really innocent. The
employer hired the offender and made that individual a supervisor—the
employer needs to be accountable for that. Additionally, the standard,
as defined in Ellerth and Faragher, is easily applicable. If the Seventh
Circuit were to begin applying different standards depending on
different factual situations, it will inevitably run into a problem other
courts are facing: what exactly is a single incident of harassment, and
how is it recognized? Harassment is harassment, whether it happens
one time or many times, and employers have to take responsibility for
harassment when it takes place in their workplaces. The Seventh Circuit
needs to promote this responsibility by refusing to drop the second
prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in single-incident cases so that
employees like Ms. Alalade do not continue to feel as if they are being
victimized by both their supervisor and their employer.
*
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affirmative defense enables an employee’s reasonable behavior (satisfaction of the second
prong) to trump an employer’s reasonable behavior (satisfaction of the first prong), resulting
in employer liability.”).
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